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ABSTRACT 
The paper examines how specific properties of the Greek political system such 
as legalism, clientelism and an authoritarian notion of accountability influence 
the deployment of information and communication technologies in the public 
sector. The paper argues that the reasons for this should be traced in the way 
bureaucratic clientelism deploys ex-ante accountability combined with 
procedural ambiguity within public organisations as a mechanism for the 
solidification of patron-client relationships both at the top and the bottom of 
the administrative echelon. As such, findings fill a lacuna in existing literature 
by showing how the practices and operations of Greek public administration 
condition ICT implementations in ways that are not conducive to actual 
reform. Thus, research in Greek public administration moves from traditional 
issues of clientelism and corruption to examine the underlying paradigm of 
action and the repercussions of the absence of a solid techno-scientific 
rationality for its operations.  
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In quest for accountability  
in Greek public administration:  
The case of the Taxation Information System (TAXIS) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Tax administration is a distinct type of bureaucracy. It constitutes, as Dunleavy 
et al. (2006) observe, the backbone of state operations since it secures the 
revenue for other government agencies to operate. Given the importance of 
taxation as a government mechanism for reallocating revenue among various 
social groups and the need for systematic and accurate information, tax 
bureaucracies are front-runners in governments’ efforts to improve efficiency 
and performance in the public sector. To this end, they are heavy users of 
information and communication technologies (ICT) and were involved in large-
scale computerization projects.  
In most Western countries, the computerization of tax bureaucracies has been 
completed since the late 1970s. Current concerns evolve primarily around 
legacy IT systems and the transition of old technologies into the internet era 
(e.g. Dunleavy, et al., 2006). Greece, although belonging to the economically 
advanced countries, was really late at successfully introducing ICT in the 
operations of the Ministry of Finance. Computerization of state finances has 
been a rather recent endeavor and an incomplete one even to this day despite 
an ambitious rhetoric by consecutive Greek governments since the late 1970s. 
The taxation information system (TAXIS) became operational only in 2000 
after several delays in its design and implementation as well as some 
unsuccessful attempts that left semi-finished systems that complicated tax 
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administration instead of streamlining it. The highly politicized nature of the 
project left little room for thorough examination of TAXIS’ actual contribution 
to tax compliance and the battle against tax evasion. However, it is precisely 
the strong intertwinement of the project with political visions on tax reform, 
dominating the Greek political scene during its implementation, that present a 
unique opportunity to study the ICT driven change against the idiosyncrasies 
of Greek state bureaucracy.  
The analysis focuses on two core properties of Greek public administration; 
the legalistic nature of accountability and the strong intertwinement of public 
administration with party politics. It is the combination of these two elements 
that reveals significant insights on TAXIS’ implementation in the mid-1990s. 
Technological change in the Ministry of Finance offered a significant 
opportunity to move from burdensome legalistic practices to a modern and 
efficient administrative apparatus based on rationalized procedures and strict 
performance criteria. However, this vision has been only partially fulfilled. The 
paper argues that the reasons for this should be traced in the way 
bureaucratic clientelism deploys ex-ante accountability combined with 
procedural ambiguity within public organisations as a mechanism for the 
solidification of patron-client relationships both at the top and the bottom of 
the administrative echelon. It is the aim of this paper to show how these 
specific properties of Greek public administration clashed with the core tenets 
of ICT driven change for standardization and transparency in terms of both 
data and procedures and the implicit assumption for instrumental 
accountability imbricated in the technological apparatus. 
In the following section, I position public accountability in the broader context 
of computerization efforts and ICT-driven change in public administration. 
Then, in section 3, I discuss accountability in the Greek public sector 
pondering on the role of bureaucratic clientelism and patrimonialism as 
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intrinsic properties of the country’s public administration. Section 4 presents 
how political parties framed TAXIS as ‘total knowledge’ and an instrument for 
battling tax evasion. The section also discusses how these framings were 
deployed in ways that preserved political patronage while rigidifying 
administrative practices of street-level bureaucracy. The role of ICTs in public 
accountability, with reference to TAXIS, is further discussed in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes with observations on the aftermath of TAXIS and the 
subsequent role of ICTs in Greek public administration. 
 
2.  Accountability and ICT-driven reform in the public sector 
Accountability in public administration refers to the establishment of those 
institutional arrangements ensuring that the authoritative and coercive 
powers of the state are not abused or misused by public servants (Aucoin & 
Heintzman, 2000). The idea of holding public servants accountable for their 
deeds constitutes a core premise of all democratic systems. Accountability 
mechanisms are in place in all political systems in order to monitor the 
exercise of power delegated to bureaucracies (Peters, 2010). It is both a 
normative concept referring to specific norms and values that need to be 
embraced in order to ensure good governance (Romzek, 2000) and a 
mechanism involving several social actors and specific procedures for 
information provision, debate and blame attribution (Bovens, Schillemans, & 
Hart, 2008). 
In the last few decades, the concept gained center stage in political discourse 
mainly because of the several reform projects triggered with the advent of 
New Public Management (Gregory, 2003). These promoted significant changes 
in traditional notions of accountability (Mulgan, 2000). As a normative 
concept, it remains an umbrella term for values such as transparency, 
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democracy, liability and responsiveness strongly promoted by new 
administrative practices in the public sector (Bovens, 2007). It is the social 
mechanism sustaining accountability as a relationship between an actor and a 
forum that is substantially altered (Bovens, 2010). As critical element of good 
governance (Romzek, 2000), accountability is based on the existence of solid 
hierarchical structures within the public sector and specific procedures for 
providing and debating the necessary information (Bovens, et al., 2008). As 
Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) observe, the debureaucratization of public 
administration which alters traditional authority structures by increasing 
discretion; the partnering of public sector with private organizations for the 
delivery of public goods and services; and finally, new conceptions of 
governance and performance driven systems expand the social actors 
involved in accountability and cause significant concerns for the possibility of 
systematic control over public actions (Stone, 1995).  
There are, however, two major issues that require further examination 
regarding the new challenges on accountability. The first concerns the 
changes introduced to administrative accountability by the widespread use of 
information and communication technologies in public administration. The 
rationale of many computerization projects intertwines efficiency gains with 
the possibility for increased performance monitoring (Newcomer, 2007). In 
line with the rationale of New Public Management, the implementation of 
technologically advanced information infrastructures is considered to facilitate 
policy co-ordination and the establishment of clear links between operational 
objectives and outcomes (Gregory, 2003). Such increased instrumentalism 
essentially reconnects accountability with its origins of giving account for 
one’s possessions (Bovens, 2005) and shifts emphasis to co-ordination and 
management of public policies. Whether increased data availability 
contributes to better accountability or not remains, however, an open 
question. As Hatry (2010) observes the growth of information available in the 
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public sector facilitates service provision and monitoring of policy objectives. 
It also empowers civil society which is in position to monitor the actions of 
public bureaucracies (Stone, 1995). It does, on the other hand, instill a 
measurement mentality which might gradually favour objectives easy to 
achieve in order to maintain high levels of performance (Newcomer, 2007). 
There is also another issue concerning this new instrumental understanding of 
accountability and the contribution of ICT-driven reform to its propagation. It 
is the transformation of accountability in countries with different 
administrative regimes. As Thomas (2003) points out the norms and practices 
of accountability are context-bound. They reflect specific constitutional 
arrangements, political processes and administrative cultures. In this respect, 
performance-driven notions of accountability reflect better the rationale of 
Westminster-type bureaucracies (Stone, 1995). The introduction of 
instrumental-based accountability mechanisms in these bureaucracies is 
bound to cause frictions with already established procedures. The issue 
becomes even more complicated when this is attempted indirectly through 
the computerization of state bureaucracies. Despite widespread beliefs on the 
neutrality of ICTs, it is quite clear that the implementation of information 
infrastructures introduces specific assumptions on the administrative 
practices of state bureaucracies. As such, they influence the function of 
accountability mechanisms and might raise resistance on behalf of the 
participating actors.  
The computerization of Greek tax administration constitutes an interesting 
case of such indirect change in the logic of administrative accountability in the 
Greek public sector. The implementation of information systems in the 
Ministry of Finance was designed to strengthen transparency and battle 
corruption, hence increase accountability. Nonetheless, the very notion of 
accountability in Greek public administration requires further analysis. The 
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strong control of political parties over public administration in tandem with 
the patrimonial character of the state formulated over the years an 
idiosyncratic notion of accountability which significantly departs from its 
Napoleonic archetype. In the following section, this is further analyzed in 
order to show the influence of information technologies in the case of TAXIS. 
 
3.  Understanding accountability in Greek public administration 
Greece, upon its constitution as an autonomous state, organized its 
administration following the premises of advanced European countries, 
especially France (Spanou, 2008). Yet, the introduction of Western institutions 
into a pre-capitalist, under-developed society, such as Greece, dominated by a 
patrimonial structure of political controls (N. P. Mouzelis, 1978), was rather 
abrupt. New institutions did not manage to supplant the ones developed in 
the context of the Ottoman Empire (Diamandouros, 1993). Formality, 
separation of person from role, objectivity of rules, hierarchical organization 
and work specialization, major tenets of modern bureaucracies, are to a great 
extent emulated and not fully embedded in the mentality and practices of 
Greek public administration (Karvounis, 2003). As a result of this uneasy 
settlement, the Greek administrative apparatus is a “mock bureaucracy” 
(Gouldner, 1955) which combines rigid legalism as the underlying principle for 
accountability with clientelism as the rationale for selecting policies and 
objectives.  
More specifically, in Greek public administration, accountability is ensured by 
rigid hierarchical structures and ex ante legal controls for bureaucratic actions. 
Administrative actions are examined for accountability prior to their execution 
(Peters, 2008). The law serves, as Peters (2010) explains, as a system of 
control in order to ensure compliance of bureaucrats to state power. This way, 
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public administration secures formal legitimacy for its actions. It also avoids 
blame attribution in case of faults. Nonetheless, legal controls in the Greek 
public sector constitute also a procedural blueprint for the formulation and 
implementation of state policies. As such it creates a rather problematic 
understanding of administrative efficiency within the Greek state apparatus. 
As Ezrahi (1990) points out, the law formalizes actions as rule-governed 
behavior without however intervening into the formation of specific 
administrative routines by state bureaucracy. Compliance to the law does not 
ensure administrative efficiency. There is also a need for an instrumental 
paradigm of action that will translate the political agenda around clearly 
identifiable objectives and policies allowing state bureaucracy to standardize 
information routinize work and monitor implementation.  
These core tenets of modern management are not followed by Greek public 
administration. As Sotiropoulos (2006) observes, the regulation of every 
aspect of administrative work by laws and decrees has been applied in Greece 
in an excessive and fragmented manner. The outcome is a very complicated 
legal framework attempting to minutely regulate every activity of the public 
sector. The parallel absence of clearly articulated policy objectives and 
standardized administrative routines gradually transformed public agencies 
into big, highly complex organizations which provide services of little value to 
the citizens. Moreover, the state apparatus is characterized by the absence of 
instrumentalism that would rationalize the actions of civil servants and 
establish concrete administrative procedures. As a result, Greek public 
administration is plagued by procedural ambiguity and non-standard 
responses even to mundane, everyday issues.  
The underlying reason for the absence of instrumental rationality rests on the 
source of legitimacy for public actions in the Greek political tradition. As 
Featherstone and Kazamias (1997) observe, legitimacy is based mainly on the 
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charisma of political leaders. This means that public administration refers to 
the political system for the approval of its deeds. This rather authoritarian 
perception of legitimacy essentially counteracts the need for an instrumental 
paradigm of action in public administration. Instrumentalism in liberal-
democratic states has specific latent political functions which, according to 
Ezrahi (1990: 17), serve to “make the coercive power of the state acceptable 
to people and validate public actions and claims in terms of democratic 
values”. In Greece, public actions are legitimized through direct reference to 
the agenda of the governing political party. Political parties serve as 
guarantors of the public good while social groups are organized around the 
party system (Lyrintzis, 2005). As a result, tensions between the requirements 
of public action and the values of individuals, that would require systematic 
justification by referring to acceptable societal goals, are solved by direct 
reference to political agendas. This way, the process of legitimation and 
accountability is quite different from that of other Western countries where 
public administration is held accountable for its actions by citizens and civil 
society organizations (Bovens, 2010).  
The combination of Napoleonic legalism with the absence of instrumentalism 
and authoritarian perceptions of accountability (N. Mouzelis, 2002) allowed 
political parties to control state bureaucracy in various ways. The absence of 
publicly established standards of adequate performance perpetuated patron-
client relations among politicians and public servants (Mavrogordatos, 1997). 
To this end, hierarchical structures were subverted while ex-ante legal 
compliance ensured that no punishment would be enforced in case of faults. 
The absence of performance criteria besides holding public servants hostages 
to the whims of politicians, it also prevented public administration from being 
efficient and providing goods services to the citizens. At the same time, civil 
society claims for better services were made in vain since legalism was the 
sole criterion while there were no publicly trusted indicators against which 
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public administration could be judged. It follows that this situation resulted in 
lack of transparency and corruption (Featherstone, 2005). Citizens needing to 
promote their affairs were obliged to enter into dealings with street-level 
bureaucrats. At the same time, the labyrinthine legal framework within which 
bureaucrats operated and the closely knitted relationships with political 
personnel allowed for top-level corruption in the form of promoting big-
business interests. 
The question that arises given the idiosyncratic nature of accountability in 
Greek public administration concerns the role of information and 
communication technologies in such a context. Data and process 
standardization accompanying the establishment of information 
infrastructures aim at strengthening accountability in the public sector by 
monitoring the completion of set objectives but also securing comprehensive 
audit trails that contain accurate and ready-to-use information. Especially, in 
the case of tax administration which constitutes both the back-bone of state 
operations but also an area fertile for illegal dealings among citizens and 
public officials. More specifically, how did political parties frame the 
transparency that follows ICT implementations and did they manage to 
reconcile it with the prevailing notion of accountability? These issues are 
discussed in the following section. 
 
4. Framing TAXIS: Reconciling administrative accountability with 
political patronage 
The Greek tax system suffers from both the lack of an inner logic and 
consistency that would ensure social justice as well as administrative 
simplicity. To this end, the prevailing logic guiding changes within the Ministry 
of Finance dictated first the rationalization of administrative practices in order 
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to create the necessary infrastructure for tax reform (Balfoussias, 2000). This 
way, the vicious circle that has blocked practically every attempt for deep 
reform (Agapitos, 1986) would break by tackling separately the two core 
problems (i.e., administrative inefficiency and complex legislation). 
The rationalization of tax administration signaled the government’s 
commitment to transparency and accountability. This strong commitment in 
these two principles can be explained only with reference to the historical 
conjuncture in the mid-1990s where TAXIS’ implementation begins. During 
this period, reform becomes an imperative emanating from outside pressures 
(i.e. Europeanization) as well as demands from the Greek society. The 
institutional capacity of the state is significantly impeded by structural 
problems (Featherstone, 2005). Clientelism, ritualism, formalism, 
centralization, frequent changes of top political personnel and inadequate 
human resources were considered as the causes of the rigid bureaucracy 
which did not allow the state apparatus to undertake its role as a motor for 
development (Spanou, 2008). To this end, the country had to renew its social, 
political and economic structures in order to overcome the problems of the 
past and pursuit a rational course of action in an increasingly competitive 
international environment where even powerful states could not cope alone 
(Diamandouros, 1997). 
The modernization project launched by the government attempted to address 
these demands by eliminating the various impediments delaying the 
Europeanization potential of the country and restructuring the government 
machine towards an efficiently operating model (Featherstone, 2005). Apart 
from the usual attempts to improve the country’s infrastructure and 
strengthen its competitiveness, modernization referred also to a political fresh 
start to complement economic and social reform. Political life had to start 
anew and proceed in the separation of the ‘party’ from the ‘state’. Reform 
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aimed explicitly at “breaking with the incestuous ‘rousfeti’ politics and 
bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past” (Featherstone, 2005a: 228). There 
is however an important parameter in this battle against corruption which 
deserves further consideration. Corruption, according to the government of 
the period, was not a phenomenon affecting upper level officials and their 
dealings with big entrepreneurs for the procurement of large scale 
infrastructural projects. It was a micro-level phenomenon affecting every 
member of Greek society since it mainly involved dealings with street-level 
bureaucrats.  
The way tax maladministration has been understood and subsequently 
framed by political parties deserves further consideration. This task is 
undertaken in the following sections. 
 
4.1. Order over an unruly tax administration 
With poor tax administration political parties essentially referred to the 
absence of well-organized information infrastructures that would monitor tax 
compliance among taxable population. Digitization of all available data would 
finally give the Ministry of Finance the opportunity to have a complete and 
accurate picture of the state’s finances. TAXIS ensured, according to 
spokespersons for the Ministry of Finance, ‘total knowledge’ since data were 
now collected and analyzed centrally. There are several articles on the daily 
press of the era quoting members of the governing party who presented the 
project as the machine inducing order to the practices of the Ministry. To 
underline the Ministry’s willingness to tame state finances, order is stressed 
even by the project’s name (i.e. TAXIS in Greek stands for order).  
At a more practical level, this meant the collection and organization of the 
vast information existing in hard copy in the 285 local tax agencies of the 
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country and in a central service of the Ministry. Thus far, tax policy was done 
in a way incompatible to the practices of a modern state in command of its 
finances. Complicated legislation coupled with lack of an appropriate 
administrative mechanism supporting the collection and processing of 
information, forced the Ministry to base its tax policy on estimates. TAXIS’ 
operation would give the opportunity to group dispersed information and 
perform various controls that would first reveal the volume of tax evasion and 
then allow its containment. Thus, fiscal policy making would be more realistic 
while monitoring and control would also be easier to implement. 
As already stated, emphasis on legalistic notions of accountability served 
primarily as a façade that covered the absence of clearly demarcated 
administrative procedures within public organizations. Red tape was not the 
outcome of thoroughly observed legal requirements and fragmented 
administrative practices which created inertia to the system. It reflected also 
the inability of public sector to efficiently organize its operations through the 
establishment of specific practices and efficient procedures. Administrative 
operations took a significant amount of time to materialize not because of 
long procedures but rather by the lack of them. The procedural path inside 
public organizations was a matter of negotiation according to its importance 
and the responsibility it entailed. This essentially anarchic situation was a 
reflection of persistent clientelism at both ends of the administrative echelon 
which actively promoted the absence of paper trails, rendering practically 
impossible any attempts to audit past actions and attribute blame. 
Furthermore, it was favoured by all political parties, especially the ones 
alternating in government, since it allowed the perpetuation of clientelism as 
the main strategy for consolidating a strong electoral base. 
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4.2. ICT in the battle against corruption 
The Ministry’s administrative restructuring, through computerization, was also 
presented as the first decisive stage in the battle against corruption. The 
rationalization of tax administration signaled the government’s commitment 
to transparency. The entangled tax legislation and the poor organization of 
local tax agencies was a chronic problem hindering the state’s ability to 
efficiently monitor tax collection. Efforts to correct it through the 
establishment of strict internal regulations have led to the establishment of a 
non-transparent web of preferential allowances strengthening clientelistic 
practices, instead of containing it.  
In this respect, TAXIS’ major function was to serve as the catalyst of obsolete 
and in many cases corrupted state bureaucracy. Computerization was 
expected to eradicate laborious and counter-productive administrative 
practices and replace them with state-of-the-art operations, equivalent to the 
ones followed by public administrations of other more advanced EU partners. 
The system had strict procedures which left no room for different 
interpretations or deviations from the norm. Thus, public servants were 
deprived from the opportunity to bent deadlines and act in favor of some 
citizens. The latter also gradually were to understand that the Ministry of 
Finance was more in control of its procedures. Automation of administrative 
procedures endowed the Ministry’s operations with objectivity which ensured 
obedience and respect on behalf of both public servants and citizens. 
Standardization and automation of administrative practices, during TAXIS’ 
implementation, rigidified institutionalized ways of work and perpetuated 
maladministration instead of battling it. TAXIS essentially computerized the 
paper-based forms that were used for the transactions with the public. 
However, these documents were not the material artifacts of a stream-lined 
and well-functioning tax administration. In the absence of systematic audit 
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procedures, paper-based forms collected information required by the law, 
without however managing to establish an audit trail for each tax-liable citizen 
or company. Therefore, TAXIS was simply collecting and grouping information 
while at the same time tax authorities failed to establish procedures that 
could deploy this information in order to trace tax evasion and strengthen tax 
collection. 
 
5. ICT and accountability in bureaucratic clientelism 
In his account of the role of technologies in shaping government operations, 
Agar (2003) observes, that “the decisive act of state power is one of 
simplification, and of course information technologies are deeply intertwined 
with this process” (Agar, 2003: 13). Such observation accurately reflects the 
vision of governmental order, substantiated through technological systems, 
promoted by global reform paradigms such as the New Public Management 
(NPM). Simplification, here, should not be viewed as the simple restructuring 
of administrative processes though automation. It rather suggests a vision of 
public administration with clearly defined objectives regarding its role within 
society and specific accountability structures. It also presumes that state 
bureaucracy will also have systematic information over the domains it 
oversees.  
However, simplification has different meanings in different contexts. In the 
case of Greece and the computerization of its tax system, simplification has 
been understood as the imposition of order over an unruly tax bureaucracy. 
Reform has been equaled to the containment of clientelism and ensuing 
corruption. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that clientelism is also the 
principal way through which social groups are incorporated into the political 
system. The Greek bureaucracy has been dominated by clientelistic 
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mechanisms aiming at the allocation of power and benefits to its adherents. It 
is obvious therefore, that computerization in itself could not restructure 
existing practices and establish a new model of operational logic in the Greek 
tax system.  
The Greek political system was not willing to replace the prevailing notion of 
accountability which nurtured clientelism with a more transparent system. To 
this end, they framed ICT driven reform, in the case of TAXIS, in a way that 
was targeting mainly street-level corruption within state bureaucracy. The 
idea of clean hands referred specifically to the dealings of citizens with civil 
servants in their everyday transactions. Such framing of corruption essentially 
channeled all reform efforts towards administrative and not political 
accountability. Despite the highly politicized nature of public sector in Greece, 
political parties, during TAXIS’ implementation, managed to frame corruption 
as an administrative problem targeting public servants as responsible for red 
tape and rigidity. In this vein, TAXIS has been envisaged mainly as an 
instrument to rationalize state finances.  
As such TAXIS was successful since it introduced rigid routine and time-frames 
that would not be subverted by users. Both citizens and public servants 
started to comply with existing deadlines. Moreover, information was now 
codified and easy to be used in various controls that would reveal tax evasion. 
However, all these targeted primarily parts of the taxable population that 
were easy to pinpoint even before the automation of the taxation system. In 
essence, TAXIS had simply automated existing administrative routines. It did 
not pave the way for a more ambitious restructuring programme that would 
essentially re-organize the way taxation was codified and administered by the 
Ministry of Finance. The main reason for this was the absence of a more 
comprehensive program of tax reform. Simple automation of fiscal 
transactions was not enough. It should be accompanied by a different 
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approach in public management based on specific quantifiable objectives 
aiming at efficient service provision. Then, these objectives ought to be linked 
to a different logic placing citizens first and not political agendas. Moreover, 
TAXIS as a project was never totally finished. 
There are specific reasons why political parties framed ICT driven reform as a 
street-level phenomenon. The most prominent of which concerns the 
reflexive nature of ICT implementation process. The development and 
implementation of information and communication technologies is a reflexive 
practice revealing the inner workings of any system of material practices. This 
view is also supported by Ciborra (2005) who considers ICT driven change as 
interplay between ordering and revealing. The automation of work practices 
and the extensive re-engineering, accompanying such activity, leads to the 
ordering of “resources, processes, people and relationships” (Ciborra, 2005: 
261). This way, information technology reveals the mechanism and 
interrelationships between the various constituent parts of societal activity. 
This revealing highlights aspects of everyday activities, which remained 
unquestioned because of their frequent use. Thus, ICT driven change is 
eroding institutional practices by bringing them to the spotlight (Zuboff, 
1988).  
The process of reflexive appreciation of existing practices during ICT driven 
reform generates a negotiation space containing the possibility for both 
success and failure. Dominant political actors may endorse the framings 
related to state modernization. Nevertheless, technology-induced changes in 
material practices are not always welcomed despite rhetorical endorsement. 
Distractions of long-established rational accounts on the existence and 
appropriateness of strongly engrained relationships may result in actions 
neutralizing instrumentalisation of administrative practices. Dominant actors 
acknowledge the necessity of technological innovation. However, the process 
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of deinstitutionalization of routinized practices is a difficult one. It triggers 
resistance on behalf of dominant actors wishing to preserve the status quo. 
This resistance is not a straight-forward phenomenon. Dominant institutional 
actors engulf ICT driven change with long-established practices and instill new 
imageries with old understandings.  
Thus, ICT driven change is infused by elements of the hosting institutional 
context which inhibit its reformatory potential without openly questioning its 
necessity. Unlike the dynamic nature of ICT innovation as a trigger for state 
reform, its neutralization is a covered process done in a piecemeal fashion. ICT 
innovation is neutralized by being implicated in mundane everyday material 
practices which bent its reformatory power. If IT artifacts cannot be unpacked 
once rigidified into black-boxes, the accompanying socio-material practices 
remain quite malleable. Dominant actors, at various levels of social hierarchy, 
can influence ICT innovation at this layer without looking like technology-
rejecting Luddites. This accounts for the existence of successful ICT innovation 
projects, where the information system is actively introduced in 
administrative practices, which nevertheless do not have any long-term 
results in the government apparatus.  
Such delegation, of aspects of state reform, to ICT driven reform should not be 
seen as the instantiation of a new mentality, slowly institutionalized, in Greek 
public administration. It was a highly symbolic act since Greek society 
demanded a modern state that would serve citizens and boost economic 
progress. It was also a necessity in the context of the European Union where 
trends of administrative harmonization demanded significant reforms and 
systematic use of ICTs. TAXIS implementation had showed that it is possible 
for ICT innovation to produce some, albeit limited, results even in rigid 
clientelistic/particularistic environments without threatening, in any 
significant way, the strong embrace of clientelistic mechanisms over the state 
  18 
bureaucracy. Thus, the political system felt confident enough to allow wide-
spread implementation of ICT and endow state bureaucracy with an image of 
modernity which covered old-workings and mentalities. Nonetheless, this 
approach to ICT innovation was not without repercussions. Subsequent 
computerization efforts, now organized into comprehensive framework 
programmes targeting several sectors of government activity, followed the 
same path of automation without radical changes in the actual working of 
public agencies. As a result, Greek state bureaucracy was caught in the 
downward spiral, observed in ICT for development projects, where poor 
results are attributed to the lack of a comprehensive digital environment 
leading to even more ICT implementation which nonetheless fails to go below 
the surface and influence deeply entrenched practices and mentalities. 
 
6. Conclusion:  When ICTs reveal nothing 
The contribution of TAXIS to tax evasion and the reduction of administrative 
burden in the Ministry of Finance remains a contested terrain. After more 
than a decade from its initial roll-out and full scale operation TAXIS role to tax 
reform raises heated confrontations among Greek political parties. TAXIS 
completion was a success in itself for a public sector that until now had a 
record of semi-finished and abandoned IT projects which impeded even the 
old paper-based practices. In this respect, TAXIS made a significant 
contribution since it managed to standardize administrative processes. 
However, it failed to simplify them enough and most importantly did not 
establish a new culture of accountability within the Ministry of Finance. As a 
result, its contribution to the efforts to battle tax evasion and boost income 
collection was as limited as previous paper-based practices. 
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Irrespectively of such mixed results, the Greek political system did embrace 
technological innovation as core ingredient of a modern state where reform is 
a continuous effort. However, the reason behind this acceptance of ICT driven 
reform, despite the revealing properties of ICTs discussed in the previous 
sections, rests on the way political parties managed to maintain the existing 
version of accountability which perpetuated their control over the state 
apparatus. TAXIS implementation showed political parties that it is possible to 
computerize administrative operations without revealing the tight relationship 
between politics and public administration. By framing tax computerization as 
a primarily administrative problem they managed to avoid a more 
comprehensive simplification of the tax system. Thus, they preserved the 
particularistic properties of the tax system with its generous individual 
allowances and the web of preferential incentives for the business sector.  
Most importantly, ICT driven reform allowed political parties to delegate a 
portion of accountability to technology itself. Failure to contain tax evasion 
was now attributed to technology. Political parties started to deploy ICT as the 
scapegoat for several fallacies of taxation. A view shared also by citizens who 
did not see new technologies to bring tax equity and justice. It is therefore 
safe to say that the new era of ICT driven modernization in Greek public 
administration was not about actual reform. It was rather a symbolic act since 
subsequent computerization efforts never contested the basic tenets of Greek 
public bureaucracy. Most projects were infrastructural while service-oriented 
ones were simply automating existing practices under the assumption that 
systematization of information would eventually lead to the restructuring of 
existing administrative procedures. 
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